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ABSTRACT 
Recent proposals assume that endowing the U.S. President 
with a line item veto  will reduce spending.  Analysis of a rich 
set of state budget data indicates that long run  budgets are  not 
altered by an item veto.  In the short run,  the item veto's 
potency is contingent upon the political setting.  Governors with 
political incentives to use  an item veto alter spending and 
revenues in a statistically significant and  quantitatively 
important fashion.  These results suggest that adoption of the 
line item veto, in general, is unlikely to reduce the  size of the 
federal government. 
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(212) 280—3680 1.  Introduction 
"We ask  the Congress, once again: Give us the 
same tool that 43 Governors have, a line-item 
veto so we can carve out the boondoggles and 
pork -- those  items that would never survive 
on their own." 
Ronald Reagan, January 27,  19871 
Ronald Reagan is the latest U.S. President to tout the 
virtues of a line item veto.2'3  His  quote above captures the 
conventional wisdom concerning the effects of a line item veto: 
the ability to veto individual spending lines will reduce 
undesirable, "pork barrel" spending and,  thus, reduce overall 
spending.4  Due to recent interest in reducing federal spending, 
some commentators have proposed a line item veto for the U.S. 
President. (See,  e.g.  Ross and Schwengel [19821.) 
Does the line item veto reduce spending?  The purpose of 
this  paper is an empirical assessment of the impact of the line 
item veto using evidence from state governments.  The  states have 
a long time span of experience with  the line item veto. 
Moreover, there is substantial variation across states in the 
precise nature of the item veto, the political environment, and 
economic constraints that may permit isolation of the  effect of 
the line item veto.  Thus, examination of the states provides an 
insight into the effects of this fiscal institution and gives a 
guide to its likely impact at the federal level. 
An important feature of the line item veto is that it is not 
an exogenous constraint on the agents in the government.  Rather, 
the line item veto alters the relative power of the governor 
-1— versus the legislature.  Analyses which ignore this are will 
result in incorrect inferences.  A key feature of the analysis 
below is the incorporation of this  relative bargaining power 
into the estimation of the impact of the line item veto on the 
state budget. 
To preview the  results, evidence from cross-state averages 
suggests that long run budgetary behavior is not significantly 
affected by the  power of an item  veto.  This holds for 
specifications that incorporate the political composition of the 
state legislature and governorship and  specifications that do 
not.  In the short run,  however, the presence of item veto power 
significantly alters the budgetary package and the size and 
direction of the  effect hinges critically upon the political 
makeup of the  governorship and the  legislature.  In particular, 
the impact of the item veto is most pronounced when a governor 
faces a legislature controlled by the opposing political party, 
but  has the capability of preventing an override of the item 
veto. 
In these circumstances, the power of an item veto serves to 
reduce deficits, but the mechanics differ by party.  Under 
Democratic governors, current spending is most affected, while 
under Republican governors capital outlays are reduced.  On the 
revenue side, non-tax revenues are reduced in both instances. 
Perhaps surprisingly, under both parties the effect of the  item 
veto is to increase both grants-in-aid to local governments and 
tax  revenues. 
—2— The  paper is organized as follows.  The  next section reviews 
previous research on the effects of the line item veto.  Section 
3 discusses the role of a line item veto in budget determination. 
The data used in this study and econometric issues are discussed 
in Section 4.  Section 5 contains  .the empirical results.  The 
final section is a summary and  conclusions. 
2.  Previous Research 
While there is often a presumption that the  line item veto 
will reduce spending, there is little empirical evidence to 
either support or refute this proposition.  For example, Ross and 
Schwengel [1982)  claim that the item veto has controlled spending 
in the states, but provide no evidence.  In a similar fashion, 
Zycher [1985)  argues that a federal line  item veto  'will not 
work', but supports this stance by simply comparing levels of 
spending (in 1984)  between states with and without the veto; 
ignoring other potentially important determinants of the state 
(and local) government budget. 
In a multiple regression study,  ACIR [1986b)  concludes that 
the total number of gubernatorial vetoes significantly reduces 
spending and regulation.  Unfortunately, the study cannot 
distinguish between line item and other vetoes.  Abrams and 
Dougan [1986]  find a negative correlation between spending and 
the existence of an item veto, but treat the item veto as an 
exogenous constraint on state governments.  While suggestive, 
these latter two  studies employ a single year of cross section 
—3— data and cannot distinguish between the effects of a line item 
veto and  unobserved state characteristics which are correlated 
with the  existence of an item veto e.g, fiscal "thriftiness"). 
In addition, the results may hinge upon the particular year 
chosen for study. 
In the other direction, some narrow evidence suggests that 
the primary use  of item vetoes is not to control spending at all. 
Abney and Lauth (1985) survey state budget officers and conclude 
that item vetoes are primarily employed to obtain "partisan" 
political objectives.  Similarly, Gosling (1986]  examines the use 
of the item  veto in  Wisconsin and concludes that it has been used 
primarily for partisan and non-spending policy purposes.  These 
studies, in turn,  suggest that a Presidential line  item veto 
would largely serve to shift additional partisan power to support 
the White House policy agenda. 
Given the paucity of evidence, the time seems ripe for a 
careful empirical look at the effects of the item veto on state 
revenues and  expenditures. 
3.  The  Line Item Veto  and State Budgets 
3.1  Models of Budgetary Determination 
How  does the line item veto affect the level and composition 
of state budgets?  To begin, one must specify a  model of the 
determination of the public sector activities.  Unfortunately, 
no consensus exists concerning the appropriate specification of 
—4— such a  model.  Inong the (not necessarily disjoint) candidates 
are  the median voter model (Black (1948]),  models in the 
"Leviathan" tradition (see,  e.g., Oates [1985]), models of 
interest group activity (see,  e.g., Mueller and  Murrell  [1986]), 
or general models of the political economy of budgeting (e.g. 
Craig and Inman [l985J). 
In order to motivate the empirical work  below, consider the 
following example.  Assume that the government produces two 
goods.  The  first is a capital intensive good which requires 
investment in the present in order to raise future provision. 
The  second is produced directly from current spending.  In each 
of two time periods (t=l,2),  agents have Cobb-Douglas utility 
functions over the per capita value of the two government 
activities and a single, composite private good: 
(3.1)  Uj(St,Ct,Xjt) = cLjllfl(St)  + aj2ln(Ct)  + (l-ajl-a2)ln(Xt) 
where i indexes agents, St is the capital intensive good per 
capita, C  is the per capita current expenditure on the second 
good, and Xj is per  capita after-tax income available for the 
purchase of private goods.  For simplicity, assume that the  flow 
of S  is proportional to the existing capital stock and that the 
constant of proportionality is set equal to one.  Then: 
(3.1')  Ui(Kt,Ct,Xit) = i1ln(Kt)  + a21n(Ct)  + (l-1-j2)ln(X1) 
Taxes per  capita, T1 and T2,  are levied in each time period so 
that: 
—5— (3.2)  — Tt,  t=l,2 
The  capital  stockevolves  according toe: 
K1 
= K  + Ii 
(3,3) 
K2  = K1  + 12 
where  K is the initial capital stock and I  is the level of 
investment spending in period t.  The  chosen tax/expenditure 
program must satisfy the present value government budget 
constraint: 
(3.4)  T1+DT2￿11+C1+D12+DC2 
where Dsl/(1+r) and  r is the constant real rate of interest, 
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal first 
period current spending (Cii),  capital spending 'jl'  total 
spending (El), and  taxes (Tjt)  chosen by agent i are given by: 
(3.5a)  [a1(l+r)/(+)r](K +  Y1  + DY} 
- K 
(3.5b)  Ci  a.2/(1-I-a)u(  +  Y1  + DY2) 
(3.5c)  Ti  Y1 
-  + Y1 + DY2) 
(3.5d)  E1  'ii + Cj1 
+ Y1  + DY2) 
- K 
where  3sl/(l+ô) and  .Sj is the pure rate of time preference for 
agent i. 
Clearly, agents will differ in their preferred levels of 
public sector spending (E1)  and taxes  {T1),  as well as the 
—6— composition (C1 or 1i  of any  given level of spending.  These 
differences are due to differences in the parameters of their 
utility functions (ail, j)  and their parameter of time 
preference, 
What budgetary package will prevail?  The simplest approach 
is to appeal to the median voter model of public provision. 
Under the appropriate assumptions, the budget adopted is the 
preferred budget of the median  voter.  As such,  it will be a 
function of the determinants of demand (income,  the relative 
price of public goods,  prices of related goods, etc.)  for a 
single individual: the median voter. 
What is the role of a line item veto?  If observed budget 
decisions are the outcome of a single agent's private utility 
maximization, there is no rationale for institutional mechanisms 
to control spending.  The  private sector gets,  by  definition, 
what it wants from the public sector. 
Suppose, instead, that individual jurisdictions elect 
representatives and that the median  voter model is an accurate 
description of the outcomes of elections both within each 
jurisdiction and in the statewide election of the governor. 
Further, assume that the governor has a line item veto such that 
he may  unilaterally veto any particular line in the budget.8 
Each representative in the state legislature will reflect 
the preferences of the median voter of his or her  district.  The 
state legislative process will consist of the "votes" (by proxy) 
of each local median voter.  If the legislature votes as a single 
-7— body on spending proposals,9the bill which passes will be that 
favored by the median point in the distribution of median voters 
across the jurisdictions. 
The  governor, in contrast, will reflect the tastes of the 
median voterin  the statewide distribution of all voters.  For  an 
arbitrary distribution of tastes in the population, the desired 
budget of the legislature and the desired budget of the governor 
will not  necessarily coincide.  Here there is a rationale for a 
line item veto: to restrict the influence of jurisdictions with 
either unusually high or unusually low tastes.1-°,--  Thus, the 
desire to endow the governorship with a line item  veto authority 
is possible even when politicians passively reflect the 
preferences of their constituents. 
What are the implications of this scenario for budget 
determination?  In this instance, the observed budget will  be 
determined by  the  governor's preferences.  By assumption these 
coincide with  those of the statewide median voter.  However, 
across states spending will differ depending upon the  presence of 
a line item  veto power, even after controlling for differences in 
tastes, incomes, etc.  of the median voters)-2 
Finally, consider a bicameral legislature.  Following the 
reasoning above, the proposal by each house of the legislature 
will be the median preferred budget among the median voters 
represented.  Here, however, the final legislative proposal will 
be the  outcome of a bargaining process between the two houses. 
As such,  it will reflect the relative bargaining powers of the 
—8— two legislative bodies.  That is, the legislative proposal to the 
governor will be a weighted average of the preferred amounts in 
the upper and  lower houses, where the weights are determined by 
the relative strength of the two houses.  Again, however, the 
governor will exercise an item veto the bill if the budget 
exceeds the median  voters tastes and the observed budget will 
coincide with  that desired by the statewide median voter. 
Thus far, the discussion has been devoted to the level of 
total spending in the budget.  An important feature of line item 
veto power is the power to alter the composition of spending and 
revenue.  In terms of the example above, the governor and 
legislature may  differ in their preferred mix  of spending for 
present  (C1) and future 1i) public goods, but  have similar 
tastes for the  mix  between public (E1) and  private (X1) 
spending.  Use  of the line  item veto permits the governor to 
alter the mix  of budgetary activitiesj3  Thus, it is possible 
that empirical research may  find no effect on the total level of 
spending or revenues, but a substantial impact on the composition 
of the budget. 
3.2  Econometric Specification 
This discussion suggests that empirical research should 
examine the budget at less than the aggregate level of spending 
or revenues, employ a specification which includes the 
determinants of private demand for public goods, and captures the 
political incentives of the governor and legislature in both the 
—9— determination of the budget and exercise of veto power. 
With regard to the first of these, this study examines three 
categories of state expenditure: current expenditure, capital 
expenditure and transfers of grants in aid  to local governments. 
For completeness, two categories of revenues are also 
investigated: total tax revenue and  total non  tax revenue. 
For each of these variables, two types of  models are 
estimated.  The first, "basic", model is a straightforward 
extension of a conventional expenditure model to include a dummy 
variable  for line item veto power.  The  second, "political", 
model more carefully specifies the political circumstances in 
which a line  item veto might be expected to influence outcomes. 
A.  Basic Model 
In  this investigation, I choose a relatively small set of 
economic variables to proxy private demand and  focus on the 
effects of veto power.  The demand curve in the analysis is 
assumed to be a function of state per  capita income, population, 
grant receipts, and  beginning of year state financial assets and 
liabilities.  To test for the impact of the line item veto, each 
equation is augmented with  a dichotomous variable which takes a 
value of one if the governor has line item  veto power and is zero 
otherwise.  Thus, for each of the five dependent variables, the 
equation estimated is of the form: 
(3.6)  "it  XitI3 + Vj + it 
—10— where  is the  dependent variable (e.g.  current expenditure) 
in state i during year t, Xj is the vector of demand 
determinants, V  is the  indicator variable for line item veto 
power, and uj  is a random error. 
B.  Political Model 
In this section, I modify the analysis to incorporate 
aspects of the political bargaining which determines the observed 
budget.  As in the basic model,  the demand curve is assumed to be 
a function of state per capita income, population, grant 
receipts, and beginning of year state financial assets and 
liabilities.  However, I assume that the parameters of the demand 
function differ across political parties.  More precisely, I 
assume that parties are monolithic  (i.e. members vote strictly 
along party lines)  and that each political party (Democrat  or 
Republican) has a  well defined demand function. 
What budget will the legislature propose?  If a party has a 
majority of seats in any house of the legislature, then the 
budget preferred by that house is assumed to be the preferred 
budget of the majority party. 
If different parties control each house, legislative budgets 
demand will be a weighted average of the party demands.  Should 
the same party control both houses, the preferred legislative 
budget is simply the budget of that controlling party.  Put 
formally, the legislative demand is given by: 
Xj3  +  (DL.XitD) + (RL'XjtR) 
-11— where  is parameter vector of the weighted average of party 
demands, D  is the parameters of Democratic party demand,  is 
the parameters of Republican party demand, DL1 if Democrats 
control both houses of the legislature, RL1  if Republicans 
control both houses, and both are zero otherwise. 
Observed budgets reflect the tastes of the governor as well. 
In the event that the governor is of the same party as that 
controlling the legislature, no modification of  (3.7)  is 
necessary.14  In the event of a "minority governor" -- a 
governor who is of the opposite party from that controlling the 
legislature -- the  governor can use his political standing, power 
to veto entire bills, etc.  to alter the  observed budget.  To 
capture this,  equation (3.7)  is augmented by a dummy variable to 
indicate the presence of a  minority governor. 
Finally, what is the correct empirical measure of the 
influence exerted on the budget by line item veto power?  The 
simple approach in the basic model is to use a dummy variable 
equal to one  if the governor has a line item veto power and equal 
to zero otherwise. 
But it may  be possible to do better than this.  First, not 
all line  item vetoes are created equal.  Table 1 summarizes the 
variety of institutions.15  As shown in column 1, 43 of the state 
governors have some type of line item veto power.1-6  Of these, 
nearly a  quarter  (10) have the further ability to reduce the 
proposed expenditure in lieu of an outright veto.  In addition, 
—12— the governor of Alabama may submit an entirely new  measure for 
consideration.  Finally, 14 governors (column 4) may  veto not 
just an entire line item, but also may  strike out languag in 
bills, while retaining the spending amount)-7 
Thus, one might wish to differentiate among these 
alternative forms of line item veto power.  However, preliminary 
research (Iioltz-Eakin  [19873)  indicated no significant 
econometric differences among these alternative forms. 
Accordingly, below I focus simply upon the presence or absence of 
some form of  line item veto power. 
There is a second, political, aspect to the measure of  line 
item veto power.  As stressed by lthney and Lauth [19853, item 
vetoes may  be influenced by partisan desires.  In the same 
fashion, they may  be restricted by political feasibility. 
Consider, the extreme case of,  say,  a Republican governor 
contemplating the veto of an item in a bill produced by a 
legislature composed entirely of Democrats.  Given the assurance 
of a legislative override of the veto, in what sense does the 
governor have a veto "power"?  The correct measure of veto power 
is one in which ability to sustain the veto is considered. 
To accommodate this, I detail two degrees of veto power.  In 
the first,  the party of governor has sufficient seats in either 
the upper or lower house of the legislature to prevent an 
override of the veto; i.e.  to sustain the veto.  Still, this is 
not  entirely satisfactory.  It includes the case in which the 
same party controls the upper house, the lower house, and the 
—13— governorship.  In this instance, presumably the executive and the 
legislature will have the same preferences and there will be no 
incentive to veto.  Thus, I create a second measure in which the 
opposing party controls both the upper and  lower house,  but the 
governor's party has sufficient votes in either house to sustain 
the veto.  This will be referred to as the ability of a minority 
governor to sustain the veto. 
To summarize, the specification of budget determination in 
the political model is: 
(3.8)  it  =  + (DL.Xit)3D)  (RL.XitR)  + 
1(DGxVit)  + a2D + a3(DxVjt)  + a4(DxVt) 
- 
a5(RGxVt)  +  + O(RXVjt)  + a8(RXVt)  + 
where  2G indicates that the governor is of party P (P=D,R), P 
indicates that the governor is of party P and  that his party is 
in a minority in the legislature, V  is a  dummy variable for 
line item veto power, and V  is a dummy variable equal to one  if 
the governor has a sustainable veto power and  zero  otherwise. 
This specification captures the effects of:  (i)  statutory 
veto power °i' cL5),  (ii)  veto power in the hands of a  minority 
governor (a, 7), and (iii)  sustainability by a  minority party 
governor (4, a8). 
—14— 4.  Data and Econometric Issues 
4.1  Data 
Three types of data are needed for the analysis budgetary 
data for the states, population characteristics of the states, 
and  political make-up of the state governments.  Budgetary data 
are taken from the Bureau of the Census Governmental Finances, 
for the years 1965 to 1983.  All variables are measured as 
logarithms of real 1972  dollars per capita.  Expenditures are 
deflated using the Gross National Product implicit price deflator 
for state-local government purchases.  Revenues are deflated 
using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures. 
Grant receipts are the sum of transfers from the federal and 
all local governments to the state government.  Assets is the per 
capita real value of  state holdings of cash and financial assets 
at the start of the fiscal year.  Similarly, Debts is the real 
per capita value of outstanding short and long term debt.  These 
variables are converted to constant dollars using the deflator 
for personal consumption expenditures and are entered as 
logarithms. 
The  population characteristics used are the logarithm of 
total population and the logarithm of real 1972  personal income 
per capita. 
Political data are taken from the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and  Social Research's data set Partisan 
—15— Division of State Governments.  This provides the total number of 
seats in both  the upper and lower house of the state legislature, 
the fraction held by each political party, and the party of the 
governor. 
Means and  standard deviations of the data are presented in 
Table 2.  The  sample covers the years 1966 to 1983  and includes 
48 states.  Alaska is excluded due to its unique budgetary 
patterns and Nebraska is excluded because its unicameral 
legislature is not consistent with the specification used herein. 
The bottom two panels of the table show the interaction of 
explanatory variables with either Democratic or Republican 
control of the governorship or both houses of the legislature. 
Thus,  55% of the observations are for Democratic governors and 
38% are for Republicans.  Interestingly, in 36%  of the cases 
Democrats controlled both houses of the legislature, while in 12% 
Republicans had  the same power.  Thus, fully 48% of the time a 
single party controls both houses.  Further in 29%  of the cases, 
control of the legislature and  governorship rested in opposing 
parties and in nearly all of these instances, the governor had 
line item veto power.  Importantly, however, in only half of 
these cases (14% of the total sample) did  the governor have 
sufficient party votes in the legislature to sustain a veto. 
4.2 Econometric Issues 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that the line item 
veto per se affects either the level or composition of the public 
-16- sector budget would be long run  evidence, evidence not  dependent 
on variations in politics, economic setting, or other short run 
behavior. 
To explore this possibility, I use a specification for both 
the basic and political model in which each variable is expressed 
the mean  value over time for each state.  Accordingly, the 
parameters are estimated, and the  effects of the line item veto 
are evaluated, using only cross-state variation in the data. 
This procedure is subject to a potentially important bias, 
however.  To the extent that there exist state-specific 
attributes which both affect spending and revenues and  are 
correlated with the right hand side variables, the parameter 
estimates will be biased and  inconsistentJ8 It is possible to 
control for both state-specific and  year-specific effects by 
using a fixed effects estimator.  In practice, this requires 
entering the variables as deviations from state and year means. 
Thus,  the parameters are estimated using a different source of 
variation: the intra-state variation over time. 
Unfortunately, use of deviations from means precludes 
estimation of the coefficient of any  variable which does not vary 
over time; particularly the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
a line item veto in the basic model.  For this reason, I estimate 
only the political model using the fixed effects technique. 
5.  Results 
In this section I present the results of estimating the 
—17— models discussed in Section 3.  A full report of the parameter 
estimates is contained in Tables 3 through 5.  Before turning to 
a discussion the estimated effects of the line item veto, it is 
worth noting that the estimated models perform quite well in 
general.  The estimated population and  income elasticities are 
consistent with previous research on the demand for public 
spending. 
As a check of the plausibility of the results, one can 
compute the reaction of the  entire budget to an increase in per 
capita income.  Using the income coefficients reported in line 2 
of Table 5, one finds that a $100  increase in income per  capita 
results in a $2.87 increase in current spending, a $1.41 increase 
in capital outlays, and  a $0.69 increase in grants-in-aid.  Total 
spending per capita rises by $4.97.  On the  revenue side, the 
increased income raises tax revenues by $3.96 and non-tax 
revenues by $0.22, for a total rise of  $4.18. 
Another interesting comparison is the spending effects of 
federal aid  versus that of  income.  Using the estimated 
coefficients in line 3 of Table 5, an increase of $100 in outside 
aid per capita increases current spending by $46.11 and capital 
spending by $16.73.  Clearly, increases aid per capita are far 
more stimulative than equivalent increases in income per  capita, 
a result suggestive of the "flypaper effect".  (See Gramlich 
t1977)  for  a discussion of the flypaper effect.)  This is 
somewhat misleading, however, as the flypaper effect refers to a 
differential spending impact resulting from identical increases 
—18— in the resources of the decisive voter.  In this instance, the 
results are entirely consistent with the absence of a flypaper 
effect if the decisive voter's share of taxes in the state is 
larger than his share of income in the state.19 
Finally, while not  the main focus of this research, the 
tables do indicate that legislatures controlled by Democrats 
(lines  7 to 12 of Tables 4 and  5) and Republicans (lines  17 to 
22) differ significantly from legislatures which are coalitions 
of the two  parties.  The estimated differential propensities to 
spend and tax out of income, assets, and  debts are often 
significantly different from zero in these circumstances. 
I leave examination of individual coefficient estimates to 
the reader and  turn to discussing the estimated effects of the 
line item veto on the observed budgets. 
5.1  Cross-State Means 
The results of estimating the basic model using cross-state 
means are presented in Table 3.  The  conclusion which emerges 
from an examination of Table 3 is that the line item veto has  no 
significant impact on long run  behavior.  More specifically, only 
in the equation for capital expenditure is the coefficient 
indicating dummy veto power different from zero at conventional 
levels of significance.  Neither is there a consistent pattern to 
the sign of the impact of the line item veto.  Based on this 
evidence, one would not  expect that adding item veto power at the 
federal level would affect long run budgetary behavior. 
—19— Is this the result of ignoring the political setting in 
which the item veto is embedded?  Table 4 presents the results of 
estimating the political model using cross state averages.  The 
same general result is found the line item veto is not 
correlated with variations in average, observed budgets.  The 
only statistically significant coefficient is found in the 
equation for non-tax revenues in panel  (b)  of the table.  There 
one finds that minority governors tend to reduce the amount of 
non-tax revenues.  However, minority governors with an item veto 
tend to raise these revenue sources.  The net  effect is close to 
zero. 
In sum, the  evidence from variations in long run behavior by 
the states does not lead one  to conclude that  the line item veto 
is a potent force in budget determination.  At that same time,  it 
sheds doubt on the conjecture that a line item veto for the U.S. 
president will tend to either reduce the level or alter the mix 
of spending and revenues. 
Still, there are reasons to be cautious about these results. 
Use of means greatly restricts the number of observations and the 
estimates may  be subject to the biases as discussed above.  The 
next section looks at the results from the fixed effects 
estimation procedure, which uses many  more observations and 
controls for state-specific attributes. 
• 
5.2)  Fixed Effects 
The results of estimating the political model, equation 
—20- (3.8),  controlling for state-effects are presented in Table 5. 
Panel  (a)  contains the results for expenditures and panel  (b) 
for revenues. 
How  does the line item veto affect spending?  States with 
Democratic governors having a line item veto exhibit lower 
current and grants expenditures, but greater capital expenditure 
(line 12).  Note, however, that only the latter coefficient is 
statistically significant.  In contrast, states with Republicans 
governors holding a veto power produce significantly more of both 
current and  capital expenditure, but less grants in aid (line 
22). 
The discussion in Section 3 suggests that the party 
composition of both the governorship and  the legislature will 
determine the impact of the line item veto on budgets.  For 
Democratic governors, these effects are shown in lines 13 to 15. 
Democratic governors facing Republican controlled legislatures 
sign budgets with significantly more current expenditures and 
significantly less grants in aid (line 13).  Importantly, line 14 
indicates that in the same situations a governor with a line item 
veto results in a budget with significantly lower current and 
capital expenditure and  significantly higher grants in aid  -- 
precisely the opposite sign pattern to a governor without the 
veto power.  Line 15 indicates that these budgetary patterns are 
not significantly altered by the numerical ability of the 
Democrats in the legislature to sustain a veto. 
Lines 22 to 25 of panel  (a)  contain a similar set of results 
-21— for Republican governors.  States with Republican minority 
governors have higher capital and current expenditure, but lower 
grants in aid.  As above, those states in which there is 
additionally a line item veto result in lower capital 
expenditure.  Unlike the Democratic case, there is no additional 
statistically significant effect of the line item veto on current 
expenditure and grants in aid.  The final line line  25) 
indicates, however, that in those cases where a minority 
Republican governor can sustain  his  veto, current expenditure is 
lower and grants in aid are increased. 
Thus, the item veto has a significant effect in the hands of 
minority governors of either party and this effect serves to 
reverse the budgetary pattern of states with minority governors 
lacking veto power.  Current and capital spending are reduced and 
grants in aid  increased.  Lastly, there is evidence suggesting 
that in this  sample the power of Republican governors is more 
dependent upon the ability of the governor to sustain the veto in 
the legislature. 
The  final panel of Table 5 contains the results for the 
revenue side of the budget.  The most prominent feature is that 
veto power has far fewer significant effects on the composition 
and level of revenues than on the composition and level of 
expenditures.  Moreover, unlike the expenditure equations, the 
effects differ by party. 
For Democrats, minority governors in states with a 
sustainable veto produce budgets with significantly more tax 
—22— revenues than in those states without a veto power.  (See lines 
13 and 15 of panel (b).)  In contrast, the effect of a 
sustainable veto in states with  Republican minority governors is 
to reduce non-tax revenues raised by the state (line 25). 
5.3 Implications 
The parameter estimates in Table 5 imply a complicated 
pattern of spending and revenue raising effects arising from item 
veto power and the political setting.  To simplify the 
presentation, Table 6 summarizes the total impact of the item 
veto,  on average, under various political circumstances.2° 
The  major lesson of Table 6 is that there are no simple 
truths concerning the impact of the line item veto.  In only 
three of the six possible cases shown does the line item veto 
result in a reduced budget deficit.  Similarly, in only one half 
the cases does total direct (current plus capital) spending fall 
due  to the presence of the item veto. 
At the same time, it does appear that there are differences 
across parties in the effects of minority governors with a line 
item veto, sustainable or otherwise.  In these cases, Democratic 
governors tend to have budgets with reduced current spending, 
while the budgets of Republican governors contain reduced capital 
spending. 
There are similarities across parties as well.  Governors of 
both parties administer budgets with lower levels of non-tax 
revenues than would otherwise prevail,  Perhaps surprisingly, 
—23— under there are circumstances in which the item veto in the hands 
of either party increases both grants-in-aid to local governments 
and tax revenues. 
Finally, the calculations in Table 6 do suggest that the 
item veto has, at times, a quantitatively important role in the 
determination of state budgets.  For example, a  $22.25 reduction 
in current spending amounts to a fall on the order of 10% in 
spending, although not  all the results are this large. 
6) S 
There have been several proposals to endow the U.S. 
President with the power of a line item veto.  Some commentators 
have suggested that the  ability to veto individual spending 
lines will reduce undesirable, "pork barrel" spending; which will 
result in lower spending, increased cost-efficiency, or both. 
This paper uses a rich set of state budget data to assess 
the empirical foundations of this conjecture.  Examination of the 
states behavior indicates that long run  budgetary behavior is not 
significantly affected by the power of an item veto.  This 
conclusion is not altered by expanding the analysis to 
incorporate the political composition of the state legislature 
and  governorship.  Thus, in general, the line item veto has  rio 
significant impact on the budgetary process. 
However, in the short run,  the potency of the line item veto 
as a method of budgetary control is contingent upon the political 
setting.  In those settings in which there are  political 
—24— incentives to exercise such a veto, i.e.  governors facing a 
legislature controlled by the opposition party,  existence of the 
veto power significantly alters the  budgetary package. 
In particular, the effect is most pronounced when a governor 
faces a legislature controlled by the  opposing political party, 
but has the numerical capability of  sustaining the item veto. 
In these circumstances, the effect of the item veto is to 
reduce deficits, but the mechanisms differ by party.  Under 
Democratic governors, current spending is most affected, while 
under Republican governors capital outlays are reduced.  On the 
revenue side,  non-tax revenues are  reduced in both instances. 
Lastly, under both parties the effect of the item veto may  be to 
increase both grants-in-aid to local governments and tax 
revenues. 
Lastly, the short run results are both statistically 
significant and,  in some cases, quantitatively important.  To the 
extent that the experience of that states is a good guide to 
federal government behavior, these results suggest that in 
particular political circumstances the  item veto may permit 
increased control over the budget.  The desirability of this 
control is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. 
—25— Table  1 
Gubernatorial  Line Item  Veto Powers 
Item  Over. 
State  Veto  Reduce  Subst.  Lang.  Over.  Type 
Alabama  Y  N  Y  N  1/2  Y 
Alaska  Y  Y  N  N  3/4  Y 
Arizona  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Arkansas  Y  N  N  N  1/2  Y 
California  Y  Y  N  Y  2/3  Y 
Colorado  Y  N  N  Y  2/3  Y 
Connecticut  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Delaware  Y  N  N  N  3/5  Y 
Florida  Y  N  N  N  2/3  N 
Georgia  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Hawaii  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Idaho  Y  N  N  N  2/3  N 
Illinois  Y  Y  N  N  1/2  Y 
Indiana  N  N  N  N  1/2  Y 
Iowa  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Kansas  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Kentucky  Y  N  N  Y  1/2  Y 
Louisiana  Y  N  N  Y  2/3  Y 
Maine  N  N  N  N  2/3  N 
Maryland  Y  N  N  N  3/5  Y 
Massachusetts  Y  Y  N  Y  2/3  N 
Michigan  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Minnesota  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Mississippi  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Missouri  Y  Y  N  N  2/3  Y 
Montana  Y  N  N  N  2/3  N 
Nebraska  Y  Y  N  N  2/3  Y 
Nevada  N  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
New Hampshire  N  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
New Jersey  Y  Y  N  Y  2/3  Y 
New Mexico  Y  N  N  Y  2/3  N 
New York  Y  N  N  Y  2/3  Y 
North Carolina  N  N  N  N  2/3  N 
North Dakota  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Ohio  Y  N  N  Y  3/5  Y 
Oklahoma  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Oregon  Y  Y  N  N  2/3  N 
Pennsylvania  Y  Y  N  Y  2/3  Y 
Rhode  Island  N  N  N  N  3/5  N 
South Carolina  Y  N  N  Y  2/3  N 
South Dakota  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Tennessee  Y  Y  N  N  1/2  Y 
Texas  Y  N  N  N  2/3  N 
Utah  Y  N  N  N  2/3  Y 
Vermont  N  N  N  N  2/3  N 
—26— Table 5  (cont.) 
Political  Model:  Fixed Effects* 
(a) 
Current 




16) Intercept  1.4646  —.33327 
(.29629)  (.74444) 
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(.12353) 
.050  45 
.08247) 
















R2  0.74 
D.F.  772 
*Sta dad  errors shown in parentheses. 
—35— Democratic 
Governor: 
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Revenues  (logs): 
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.3409  5 
.44578 
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Current  Capital  Grants 
Expenditure  Expenditure  in Aid 
1.7875  6.1050  —3.3880 
(1.4659)  (2.2422)  (4.3862) 
—.1312  —.2089  .2252 
(.0260)  (.0398)  (.0780) 
.3682  —.1724  .2621 
(.1615)  (.2470)  (.4833) 
.4124  .1849  .5031 
(.1203)  (.1841)  (.3601) 
.0078  .2255  .2074 
(.0705)  (.1079)  (.2111) 
.0874  .0385  —.1727 
(.0266)  (.0407)  (.0797) 
—.0117  .1985  —.0444 
(.0573)  (.0877)  (.1717) 










1)  Intercept 
2) Population 
3)  Income 
4) Grants 
5)  Assets 
6)  Debts 
7) Veto 
D.F. 
*Stdd errors shown in 
-29— Table 4 
Political Model:  Cross-State Means* 
(a) 
Current 
Expenditure  ___________ 
1)  Intercept  -  .0627 
(3.6028) 
2) Population  -  .1605 
(.1314) 
3) Income  .7118 
.5278) 
4) Grants  .3872 
(.3178) 
5) Assets  .2343 
.2119) 
6) Debts  —.2825 
(.1346) 
Democratic Interactions: 
7) Intercept  2.7758 
(5.8830) 
8) Population  .1148 
(.2397) 
9) Income  —1.0227 
(.8311) 
10) Grants  .3420 
(.5212) 
11) Assets  —.1076 
(.3416) 
12) Debts  .6078 
.2070) 
13) Veto  —.2224 
(.2105) 
14) Minority Gov.  .7489 
(.4654) 
15)  Veto  —.7303 
(.4893) 
16)  Sustainable  .1095 
(.3426) 
*Stdd  errors shown in parentheses. 
—30— 
Capital  Grants 
Expenditure  in Aid 
2.1801  —1.8248 
(6.0857)  (12.1965) 
— .1096  —.4440 
(.2220)  (.4450) 
.1760  1.5652 
(.8916)  (1.7869) 
.1120  .3912 
(.5368)  (1.0758) 
.3115  —.5468 
(.3580)  (.7175) 
—.0639  .4055 
(.2275)  (.4559) 
8.7089  3.6835 
(9.9373)  (19.9155) 
—.0223  1,0867 
(.4049)  (.8116) 
—1.3465  —2.5500 
(1.4039)  (2.8137) 
—.1128  .0936 
(.8805)  (1.7647) 
.0981  .6472 
(.5770)  (1.1564) 
.3670  —.6152 
(.3497)  (.7009) 
.8839  —.5676 
(.3556)  (.7127) 
—.3392  —2.6148 
(.7862)  (1.5758) 
—.5988  2.8186 
(.8265)  (1.6565) 
.1522  —.0224 
(.5788)  (1.1600) Table 4  (cont.) 












Current  Capital  Grants 
Expenditure  Expenditure  in Aid 
10.0898  —26.1598  19.3767 
(15.4877)  (26.1611)  (52.4299) 
.1611  —.6962  2.2763 
(.5040)  (.8514)  (1.7063) 







(.9589)  (1.6198)  (3.2463) 







(.4461)  (.7536)  (1.5104) 
.2413 
— .2519  —.6472 
(.2333)  (.3941)  (.7899) 
Gov.  —.6874  2.0882  —.4095 
(.7291)  (1.2315)  (2.4682) 
.7806  —1.4510  .7955 
(.6899)  (1.1654)  (2.3357) 
—.0207  —.5463  1.4805 















D.F.  22 
*Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
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0.70 









































—  .0555 
(.3583) 



























Table 4  (cont.) 
political  Model:  Cross-State  Means* 
(b) 
1)  Intercept 
2)  Population 
3)  Income 
4) Grants 
5)  Assets 
6)  Debts 
7)  Intercept 
8)  Population 
9)  Income 
10)  Grants 
11)  Assets 
12) Debts 
13) Veto 
14)  Minority  Gov. 
15)  Veto 
16)  Sustainable Table 4  (cont.) 



























































24) Minority  Gov. 
25)  Veto 
26)  Sustainable 
0.64 
22 Table 5 





























—  .07102 
(.06717) 
























—  .09637 
(.03822) 






*Standard errors shown in parentheses. 
—34— 
Current  Capital 
Expenditure 






2) Income  .51585 
(.05679) 
.82219 
(.14269)  (.12718) 






4) Assets  .05613 
(.02268) 
.09656 
(.05698)  (.05079) 













13) Minority Gcv. 
14)  Veto 
15)  Sustainable Table 5  (cont.) 
Political  Model: Fixed Effects* 
(b) 
1)  Population 
2)  Income 
3) Grants 
4)  Assets 
5)  Debts 
Tax 
Revenue 



































—  .00347 
(.01800) 
—  .04551 
(.02485) 




















—  .04860 
(.05125) 
—  .02830 
(.03518) 
*Stdd  errors  shown in parentheses. 
—36— 
6)  Intercept 
7)  Population 
8)  Income 
9)  Grants 
10)  Assets 
11)  Debts 
12)  Veto 
13)  Minority  Gov. 
14)  Veto 
15)  Sustainable (b) 
Tax  Non-tax 
Revenue  Revenue 
.76621  2.4740 
(.31258>  (.49153) 
—  .00790  —  .02404 
(.01260)  (.01981) 
—  .02628  —  .15599 
(.05819)  (.09151) 
—.00578  —  .11909 
(.03885)  (.06109) 
—  .08529  —  .05939 
(.03497)  (.05500) 
.01713  .01812 
(.01197)  (.01882) 
.01075  —.01559 
(.01773)  (.02789) 
— .06884  —  .01553 
(.02679)  (.04214) 
.03884  .01456 
(.03125)  (.04914) 
.00661  —.07006 
(.01693)  (.02662) 
0.68  0.47 
772  772 
*Standard  errors shown in parentheses. 
_:r7_ 
Table 5  (cont.) 
Political  Model: Fixed Effects* 








23) Minority  Gov. 
24)  Veto 
25)  Sustainable 
R2 
D.F. Table  6 
Effects of Veto on Budget 
Democrat  Republican 
Governor: 
Current Expenditure  -1.29  9.92 
Capital Expenditure  11.86  8.46 
Grants—in—Aid  —13.40  —11.34 
Tax  Revenue  -0.96  2.98 
Non-Tax  Revenue  -5.55  -1,18 
Effect on Deficit  3.68  5.24 
Minority  Governor: 
Current Expenditure  -22.25  14.61 
Capital Expenditure  -0.12  -7.21 
Grants-in-Aid  12.82  -5.39 
Tax Revenue  -11.40  13.75 
Non-Tax  Revenue  -9.23  -0.08 
Effect on Deficit  11.08  -11.66 
Minority  Governor 
with Sustainable Veto: 
Current Expenditure  -22.11  -0.60 
Capital Expenditure  0.75  -10.68 
Grants—in-Aid  13.16  5.13 
Tax  Revenue  7.49  15.59 
Non-Tax Revenue  -11.38  -5.39 
Effect on Deficit  -4.31  -16.35 
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—40— Notes 
1.  This quote is taken from the State of the Union Address as 
reported by the New York Times, January 28,  1987,  p. A16. 
President Reagan repeated his  call for a line item veto in his 
Address the following year. 
2.  See Ross and  Schwengel [1982]  for an review of Presidents' 
attitudes toward the item veto. 
3.  The Reagan Administration requested an authority quite 
similar to the line  item veto, an "enhanced rescission 
authority".  Under this system, Congress would be compelled to 
vote on Presidential requests to delete items from the budget.  A 
simple majority would be necessary to retain the budget line. 
(See  Newsweek, January 12,  1987,  pp.  22.) 
4.  This is not the only possibility.  It may  be that resources 
will  be used in a more cost-efficient fashion and spending is 
unchanged. 
5.  For  an excellent survey of the alternative models, see Inman 
[forthcoming]. 
6.  This ignores depreciation, but this  simplification does not 
affect the substance of the results. 
7.  Notice that agents may also have differing expectations 
concerning incomes and interest rates.  These are assumed to be 
identical here in order to focus on the role of preferences. 
8.  The possibility of veto override is considered below. 
9.  Only Nebraska has a  unicameral legislature. 
10.  Consider the following simple example.  The state consists 
of 3 districts of  3 voters each.  In the "high taste" district 
the  voters prefer, respectively, spending in the amounts $300, 
$200,  $100 per  capita.  Their elected representative will reflect 
the median voter and "prefer" $200.  In the "medium taste" 
district the voters preferences are for  $200,  $150,  and $100 per 
capita and their representative will prefer $150.  Finally, in 
the "low taste" district the preferred amounts are $100,  $50,  and 
$25.  In the legislative "vote" the outcome will pit spending 
amounts of $200,  $150,  and $50; with the outcome being a proposal 
of $150.  On the other hand,  the governor will reflect the median 
voter of the entire distribution and prefer $100.  Thus, there is 
an incentive for the governor to reduce spending by a  method such 
as the line item veto. 
—41— 11.  The  usual assumption is that the line item veto will be used 
to reduce spending; i.e.  that it is the influence of high taste 
districts which must be controlled.  Notice that if spending is 
too low,  the governor may simply reject the entire bill. 
12.  Notice, however, that there is no prediction concerning the 
sign of the item veto effect. 
13.  This points out a more general legislative strategy in the 
face of an effective line item veto: reduce the number of "lines" 
by bundling together objectionable  (from the governor's 
viewpoint) and  desirable spending items.  To the extent that this 
is possible even when the governor can sustain a veto, the 
methods used below will not reveal the influence of a line item 
veto.  Of course, this suggests another empirical test: is the 
number of budget lines inversely correlated with the ability of 
the governor to successfully employ a line item veto? 
14.  This follows from the assumption that parties are monolithic 
and  have well-defined demands. 
15.  The  data in Table 1 are as of 1985.  In general, 
gubernatorial item veto power is quite old.  The President of the 
Confederacy had (but did  not  exercise) item veto power during the 
Civil War and 28 states (of  a total of  45) adopted a line item 
veto between 1860 and 1900.  By 1930,  41 of the 48 states had a 
provision for line item veto power.  The governors of Iowa and 
West Virginia acquired line item veto  power in 1969.  See 
Benjamin  [1982]  for  a discussion of the growth of veto power. 
16.  Of the remainder, only six can  veto a  bill at all.  The 
governor of North Carolina has no veto powers. 
17.  Differences exist even within these categories.  See ACIR 
t1986a] for details. 
18.  An instrumental variables procedure will yield consistent 
parameter estimates, but it is difficult to find satisfactory 
instrumental variables. 
19.  To see this,  consider the budget constraint of the decisive 
voter in a simplified model: 
(19.1)  d =  xd  + 
Y  is income, X is private consumption, T is taxes paid, and the 
superscript "d" identifies the decisive voter.  Using lower case 
letters to denote per capita terms, the government budget is: 
(19.2)  e=t+a 
where e is expenditures, t is taxes, and  a is aid.  Define 
—42— .t=Td/t, solve  (19.2>  for Td,  substitute into (19.1)  and  re- 
arrange.  The result is: 
(19.3)  yd÷caxd+-ce 
Finally, define syd/y, where y is income per capita; yielding: 
(19.4>  y÷taxd+te 
Suppose that a $1 increase in resources to the  decisive voter 
induces $  in additional spending.  Notice that a $1 increase in 
income per capita translates into a $  increase in income to the 
decisive voter, resulting in $ct' in spending.  In contrast, a $1 
increase in aid  per capita is equivalent to a $t increase  in 
resources to the decisive voter and  produces $at in additional 
spending.  In these estimates $at  >  $cv,  which may  simply reflect 
and  not the presence of a flypaper effect. 
20.  The entries in Table 6 are calculate using the estimated 
parameters  in Table  S without regard to their statistical 
significance. 
—43— 